Pondering vexing issues in infection prevention and control
Friday, July 17, 2020
Tuesday, July 7, 2020
Let's Just Get Every Face Covered
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| Photo by cottonbro at pexels.com |
Sunday, July 5, 2020
A tiresome SPAT
I’m surprised that we can’t stop arguing about the modes of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, despite the fact that most experts (including our friends at WHO) agree on the important issues. Our colleague Jorge Salinas very nicely summarized these issues (and their implications) in this post.
The latest kerfuffle: media coverage of 239 experts who are upset that the WHO is not acting as decisively as they’d like on an evidence base that the experts themselves admit is far from definitive.
As we’ve outlined here and here, a major problem plaguing this discussion is the false dichotomy between “droplet” and “airborne” transmission that we use in healthcare settings (for simplicity of messaging, and because it has served us well for several decades—for reasons I’ll get back to later). This dichotomy divides application of transmission-based precautions between those pathogens spread via respiratory droplets, all of which must absolutely fall to the ground within 6 feet of the source, and those pathogens which become airborne, meaning they travel long distances on air currents, remain in the air for very long periods of time, and most importantly, can cause infection after their airborne sojourns if they find the right mucosal surface.
But we know (and WHO experts know) that there is no such dichotomy—it’s more of a continuum. At the very least there is a middle category, let’s call it Small Particle Aerosol Transmission (or SPAT). Many respiratory viruses (not just SARS-CoV-2) can remain suspended in aerosols and travel distances > 6 feet. As Jorge outlined, it’s probable that transmission events occur when these aerosols are concentrated in closed, poorly ventilated spaces or in very large amounts (e.g. a 2+ hour choir practice, a 3 hour indoor birthday party, a crowded bar). This may explain the superspreading events that drive a lot of SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
It’s important to distinguish SPAT from “classic airborne transmission” (let’s call it CAT). The CAT pathogens (TB, measles, VZV) have very different transmission dynamics than SPAT pathogens, as I outlined here (R0s of >10, household transmission rates of 50-90%). The distinction is important because for most healthcare epidemiologists, using the term “airborne” implies a common set of “one-size fits all” interventions to prevent transmission, interventions that require resource-intensive engineering controls and PPE requirements. It is not at all clear that such interventions are required to prevent transmission of SPAT pathogens. In fact, most evidence (and real world experience) suggests that they are not. This is why the droplet-airborne dichotomy has served us fairly well over the years—either because droplet precautions appear to be pretty effective at preventing SPAT, or because SPAT is rare even among those viruses capable of it.
I could say more about my feelings about aerosol-scientists criticizing epidemiologists and clinicians for having an “overly medicalized view” of the evidence, but I don’t want to be CAT-ty. I just want to end the SPAT.
So let’s redirect the discussion instead to: with the limited information we have, what additional interventions should WHO and/or CDC recommend for transmission prevention during the pandemic? Masks in crowded indoor spaces? Sure, but avoiding such spaces is preferred. Improved ventilation in all indoor environments? Absolutely, let’s get to work on that. N95s in the community? Don’t make me laugh, it might generate aerosols.* N95s for all patient care? Fair to consider, but by now we’ve gathered quite a lot of experience safely delivering care using existing WHO recommendations. And as Jorge aptly pointed out, “a debate only centered on whether respirators or medical masks are needed can distract us from the bigger challenges.” Indeed.
*Clarification as this comment, made in jest, has been misinterpreted. N95 masks do not generate aerosols. They are unrealistic for community use, as they must be fit-tested and worn properly (even if we had an unlimited supply, which we do not). Nor are they, in my opinion, necessary for community protection. Face shields or medical/cloth masks are preferred for community use.
Thursday, June 18, 2020
COVID-19 Can Have Airborne Transmission but You Don't Need to Run for an N95
This is a guest post by Jorge Salinas, MD, Hospital Epidemiologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics.
There is virtually no doubt that SARS-CoV2 is transmitted by droplets and contact. However, the debate continues about whether SARS-CoV2 can be transmitted through the air, in what epidemiologists call “airborne transmission.” As with most biologic processes, unfortunately this is not a dichotomy. Many (too many) factors play a role.
Population density matters. As people breathe, speak, sneeze,
or cough we all produce many particles that have a continuum of sizes. These
particles are unfortunately called too many names in the literature and the lay
press (e.g., droplets, aerosols). Viruses and biologic processes don’t read
textbooks. These particles can be large (what healthcare epidemiologists call “droplets”),
medium size (no fancy name for them), and small (these are called “aerosols” by
some but “droplet nuclei” by others). If we are near only one infectious person,
the number of small particles (aerosols) expelled may not be enough to meaningfully
contribute to infection. But if we are exposed to many infectious people at
once, the number of small particles can increase. In such instances, airborne
transmission in addition to contact and droplet transmission can play a role in
outbreaks.
Patient characteristics are also tremendously important. Some
may extrapolate that COVID is not as contagious or rule out the possibility of
airborne transmission because of a paucity of hospital outbreaks, even if not
following airborne precautions.
If we follow the natural history of COVID, we now know that a person is
possibly infectious 48 hours before symptom onset. Most people do not require
hospitalization, and those that require hospitalization may be in later stages
of the disease. We are learning daily that COVID, the disease caused by
SARS-CoV2, is likely a continuum. Initially, the disease is predominantly
caused by direct injury of the virus to tissues, but as days go by some
patients will have immunologic or para-infectious syndromes that may require
hospitalization. By the time a patient with COVID requires hospitalization,
their infectiousness has likely decreased. It is now clearly recognized that
presence of viral RNA does not equal risk of transmission in many cases.
The setting is also very important. How big is the space
where the infectious person and their potential contact are located. If
outdoors, the risk is tremendously decreased as air flows freely greatly
decreasing the possibility of breathing “the same air.” Indoors, the number of
air exchanges is very important: the more air exchanges, the lesser the
likelihood of spread. Fortunately, most hospitals have already implemented an
increased number of air exchanges likely decreasing the possibility of airborne
transmission of pathogens in hospitals.
If airborne transmission plays a role in SARS-CoV-2
transmission, I believe it is predominantly in the early stages of the disease,
in the viral phase. That may explain why most healthcare outbreaks have
occurred in nursing homes and long-term care facilities. Not only because of potential
infection prevention deficits but because patients are already in the facility
when they become infectious. They are at the peak of infectiousness when in the
facility. Hospitals on the other hand, will usually admit patients days or even
weeks after the beginning of the infectious period, likely attenuating the risk
of transmission in hospitals.
Recognizing that SARS-coV2 can also spread via small
particles should not lead to panic. It should lead us to modify our behaviors
in the community by avoiding crowded indoor settings, using universal source
control with face coverings, and maintaining physical distance.
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| Modified from CDC. |
Reducing population density in healthcare facilities
(patient census and personnel) can lead to increased safety but has a
tremendous impact on population health (less capacity to take care of patients)
and potential economic implications if healthcare personnel numbers are
decreased. Engineering controls are also costly but fortunately most hospital
design standards already address increased air exchanges compared to regular
buildings and homes.
This pandemic has been challenging for all. COVID-19 keeps
me humble as what I thought I knew yesterday may not be true today. Let’s all
remain humble and nimble as we respond to COVID-19 in the community and in
healthcare facilities.
Saturday, June 6, 2020
Need a Face Shield?
- 1800Shields
- 3DPPE
- Active Shield
- Actuated Medical
- Alisa Pan
- AltheaCare
- Amazon (multiple vendors)
- AMDA Lenses
- Armor Expert
- Arsenal
- ArtToFrame
- ASPEUS
- BDI Signs
- Be Ready
- Blue Bear Protection
- Bolle Safety
- Brooklyn Textiles
- Care Goody
- Counshop
- DebonAIR
- Disc Makers
- Distance Masks
- Dome Shield
- Eagle Eye Optics
- Ebay (multiple vendors)
- Eco FaceGuards
- Egis Viso
- FABBERZ
- FACEGUARD USA
- FACESHIELD
- Fire Farm
- Flowfold
- Fusion Lens
- Garizone
- GetEm Innovations
- GoodShield
- Google shopping (multiple vendors)
- Grace Technologies
- Hardwire
- Henry's Health Shield
- Humanity Shield
- i-Mask+ Face Shield
- Inspired Trends
- Iowa Made
- Kitsbow
- Laminati PPE
- Lifted Lenses
- Makers4Medicine
- Medspec Protect
- MI Face Shields
- Moda Loom
- MSP Aviation
- Noel Asmar
- No Headache
- OCTPLACE
- Shield48
- Sparx
- SRP
- Sveda Organics
- Technique Medical
- TheOne08
- TrueHero
- Unified
- Wet Shield
- ZVerse
Tuesday, April 14, 2020
Lessons from a Pandemic: Part 2
| Photo by Volodymyr Hryshchenko on Unsplash |
- Working at home truly increases efficiency. For the first time ever, I worked at home for an entire week. Previously, I had never worked at home for more than a day, and only if I had a project that required intense focus or a need to get it completed quickly. I had multiple Zoom meetings every day and gave four lectures by Zoom. What I now realize is that the many interruptions in my work day, with all the starting and stopping and the re-start after every interruption really reduce efficiency. At the hospital most of my meetings involve a 5-10 minute walk each way and when you have numerous meetings that adds up. And along the way you stop for unplanned chats that increase walking time. I also feel the need to check in with people that I work with and discuss current work issues. That's a good thing, but I now have a better view of how all of this impacts my workflow.
- Medical care doesn't necessarily need to be face-to-face. Last week I had my first telemedicine clinic. I had done telemedicine inpatient infectious diseases consults for small community hospitals in the past but never outpatient clinic. It worked very smoothly. For most patients, particularly those with known problems, auscultation, palpation, and percussion don't add all that much. Once the outbreak is over, it will be interesting to see how many clinic visits return onsite. With advances in technology, patients can have BP cuffs that transmit readings, pulse oximieters, and even wireless stethoscopes at relatively low cost, making good assessment in the patient's home much more achievable.
- Determining what is and is not an aerosol-generating procedure (AGP) needs to be thoroughly explored in future research. See these two excellent posts by Tom Talbot here and here to read more about AGPs.
- In times of crisis, healthcare workers' risk tolerance is greatly reduced and risk perception is not always rational. This is natural given all of the information on the outbreak, much of it scary, that comes at us 24/7. There is a cry for zero risk, even though that is likely not achievable. In an effort to advocate for their constituencies, professional societies have added to the anxiety and created more demand for resources that are already scarce, such as testing supplies and personal protective equipment.
- Once and for all, we need to determine the utility of every item of personal protective equipment for various types of pathogens. This will require federal funding to do the needed research. New designs should be evaluated and current PPE improved.
- The focus of infection control and prevention research has been too focused on bacterial pathogens. Looking at journals from the last decade, one can see that most of the papers are focused on drug-resistant bacterial pathogens. These organisms pose little risk to healthcare workers. As above, federal funding will be needed to accomplish the needed work.
- CDC has not been helpful by producing confusing information that is not practical, and SHEA and APIC have offered little to no guidance at a time when it is most needed. In contrast, the World Health Organization has produced guidance that is based on sound logic and written in a very clear manner.
- Anthony Fauci is a hero. Where would we be without him? Don't think about the answer to that question.
Saturday, April 11, 2020
The Face Shield Strategy: Moving to the Community
| REUTERS/Athit Perawongmetha |
OSHA! OSHA! OSHA!
In many parts of the country, as rates of COVID-19 are declining and vaccination coverage is increasing (albeit with substantial variati...
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Back on clinical service again and having more thoughts on poor hospital design. Last month I wondered why there were no stethoscope wipe...
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This is a guest post by Jorge Salinas, MD, Hospital Epidemiologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics. There is virtually no...
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I’m surprised that we can’t stop arguing about the modes of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, despite the fact that most experts (including our frie...


