Showing posts with label MERS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MERS. Show all posts

Monday, July 25, 2016

Infection Prevention Summer Reading

With apologizes to our colleagues in the Southern Hemisphere, many of us are traveling a bit this summer and are looking for good things to read. At the top of my reading list is Ed Yong's new book, "I Contain Multitudes: The Microbes Within Us and a Grander View of Life." The book by the highly regarded UK science journalist (The Atlantic, National Geographic) digs into the relationship between microbes and animals. Unfortunately, the book won't appear until August 9th, so you'll have to be a bit patient and find something else to read.

In the meantime, I've listed five recently published journal articles/studies that will hopefully tide you over until "I Contain Multitudes" appears at your bookstore.

1) A Flawed Revision of the Common Rule (Joffe and Magnus, Annals 19 July 2016). The Common Rule is the regulatory framework that guides human subjects research, think IRB. Last September, 16 federal agencies released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking outlining proposed changes to the Common Rule. There are several potentially important changes that could negatively impact infection prevention and stewardship studies. First, the Notice seeks to redefine all research on biospecimens, including de-identified specimens, as human subject research requiring "broad consent" before storing the specimens. The discussion didn't mentioned microbiology specimens specifically, but this requirement is concerning. Second, the Notice would only exclude QI research from review if it analyzed proven interventions and limited study endpoints to utilization outcomes (e.g. cost). However, QI projects such as quasi-experimental studies of the impact of CLABSI checklists on BSI rates or mortality WOULD require IRB review and potentially individual informed consent. (Yikes!)  My sense is this could drastically curtail important research in MDRO prevention and most infection control research. Stay tuned.

2) Control of an Outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome in a Tertiary Hospital in Korea (Park GE et al. Annals, 19 July 2016). From May to July 2015, 186 confirmed cases of MERS-CoV occurred in S. Korea. The authors provide an in-depth description of a 92-person outbreak in a single tertiary-care hospital in Seoul. Interestingly, 82 of the cases occurred after exposure to a single secondary patient cared for in their emergency department. All cases were identified through contact tracing and monitoring of exposed patients and healthcare workers and all in-hospital transmission was secondary to three patients with pneumonia and productive cough. The description of events was very sobering.

3) Colonization With Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and Risk for Infection Among Asymptomatic Athletes: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis (Karanika S et al, CID 15 July 2016). The results of this study suggest that you shouldn't be an athlete (6% MRSA colonization rate), especially a wrestler (22% MRSA colonization rate). Additionally, the authors reported that colonization increases the risk of subsequent skin and soft tissue infection 7 times. If only it were safer to lay around on the beach this summer.

4) Addressing Infection Prevention and Control in the First U.S. Community Hospital to Care for Patients With Ebola Virus Disease: Context for National Recommendations and Future Strategies (Cummings KJ et al. Annals 5 July 2016). Authors from the CDC, Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas and other other institutions describe the massive infection prevention response that followed the infection of two MICU nurses who cared for the index patient from Liberia. The responses included protocols for specimen handling, managing medical waste and standardized PPE with education and monitoring. Nothing particularly novel in 2016, but the article certainly highlights the massive efforts and costs associated with the N=1 response that was required because of a chronically underfunded public health and infection prevention infrastructure.

5) A Novel Microbiome Therapeutic Increases Gut Microbial Diversity and Prevents Recurrent Clostridium difficile Infection (Khanna S et al. J Infect Dis 15 July 2016). The authors describe an alternative method to fecal transplants that could potentially avoid donor screening among other barriers. They tested SER-109, which is encapsulated spores captured from healthy human donor stool that was treated with ethanol to eliminate pathogens, for the prevention of recurrent CDI. The cohort of patients had to have had >3 CDI cases in the prior 12 months and a clinical response to antibiotic therapy for their current CDI episode immediately prior to dosing of SER-109. The 15 patients in cohort 1 received high-dose capsules (15 on day 0 and 15 on day 1) and 15 patients in cohort 2 received lower dose capsules on a single day. Overall, 87% achieved the endpoint of no CDI at 8 weeks. If you're interested in reading more, there is an excellent accompanying editorial.

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

MERS in S. Korea and Infection Control



I've been thinking about this all week, and came to the conclusion that I don't have much of a take on the latest outbreak. Surprising, I know, given how we are the number one "therapeutically abrasive blog"* on the interweb. With that said, I want to counter a meme I've seen emerging.

In Nature News today there was an article and a quote from David Heymann, chair of Public Health England, that I found a bit concerning. He said, “The focus on South Korea would be better directed towards Saudi Arabia.” It appears to me that the article and he are suggesting that it's more important to study episodic animal-to-human transmission than to focus on human-to-human infection control. I think this is a poor choice (or perhaps a poor choice of words) for a number of reasons. First, it is unlikely that prevention activities in Asia compete for research dollars with epidemiological investigations in the Middle East - we can and should do both! Second, in the case of MERS, CDC has estimated that more than 90% of cases could be linked to health care exposures. So, if we care about preventing incident human cases, public health authorities must still focus on understanding and halting nosocomial transmission. Finally, in a recent article in Time, the CDC's Tom Frieden said “Hospitals can become amplification points...It’s the case in measles, it’s the case for drug-resistant tuberculosis, it’s the case for MERS and SARS and Ebola. That’s where sick people go and that’s where vulnerable people are. It really emphasizes the importance of good infection control in the health care system.”

And if I can extend what Dr. Frieden said - we don't actually know how to achieve good infection control for MERS and the other pathogens he mentioned. If only we invested in studies to understand how to best implement PPE in these settings. One could imagine improved PPE technology, refined PPE donning and doffing algorithms and enhanced environmental cleaning as potential targets for future studies examining optimal protection from MERS. Not coincidentally, many of these are the same targets that Mike, Dan and I mentioned in our Ebola+PPE editorial several years months ago. If we invest in infection prevention technology and implementation research, our health care system will be safer regardless of the pathogen du jour.

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For those interested in reading more about infection control for MERS, I suggest a recent review by Westyn Branch-Elliman, Connie Savor Price, Alison McGeer and Trish Perl in the March 2015 ICHE. ICHE has graciously made the review "free access" for the month, so download the PDF now. Of note, this group has first hand experience with MERS infection control in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, CID just published an invited review on MERS for clinicians that is also free access. Finally, for a recent update on the S. Korean outbreak I suggest this excellent article by Julia Belluz in Vox.

*I found "therapeutically abrasive" quite funny and think it could be very useful in preventing C. difficile

Saturday, May 3, 2014

MERS: A Primer

Yesterday the CDC reported the first case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in the United States. The patient is a healthcare worker who flew from Saudi Arabia to Chicago (via London), and then traveled by bus to Indiana, where he is currently hospitalized.

I suspect this is the first of many posts on this topic. In case you have not been following the MERS story, I put together a summary to get you up to speed.

Epidemiology
  • Approximately 400 cases have been reported since the first case was reported in 2012.
  • All cases have been acquired in 6 countries in the Arabian peninsula, though some cases became symptomatic after travel to other countries.
  • The virus (a novel coronavirus) appears to have originated in bats, but antibodies to the virus have been found in camels.
  • Transmission dynamics are not completely understood. Human-to-human transmission does occur, and some cases are associated with contact with camels.
  • About 1 in 5 cases have been healthcare workers who cared for patients with MERS.

Clinical (excellent reference by Hui et al here)
  • The incubation period is 2-13 days (median, 5 days).
  • The illness is characterized by pneumonia, which in most cases is severe (80% require ventilatory support).
  • Typical cases begin with fever, cough, chills, sore throat, myalgia and arthralgia, followed by dyspnea and rapid progression to pneumonia.
  • Severe cases may be associated with ARDS, septic shock and multiorgan failure.
  • Fever is almost always present.
  • GI symptoms (nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea) are present in 1/3.
  • Chest imaging is always abnormal; findings include bilateral hilar infiltrates, patchy infiltrates, segmental or lobar opacities, ground glass opacities and small pleural effusions.
  • Routine laboratory abnormalities are variable.
  • Mortality rate is ~30%. In fatal cases, median time from presentation to death is 11.5 days.
  • Asymptomatic infection can occur.

Diagnostic Testing (detailed instructions by CDC here)
  • In the US, all testing is performed by public health laboratories.
  • PCR is available for BAL fluid, tracheal aspirate, pleural fluid, sputum, NP/OP swabs, NP wash/aspirate, and serum.
  • Antibody testing: acute (first week of illness), convalescent (>3 weeks after acute sample obtained).

Treatment
  • No specific antiviral therapy is currently available.
  • Treatment is focused on supportive care.

Infection Control and Prevention (CDC guidance here)
  • Contact and airborne precautions are indicated for patients under investigation, and suspected and confirmed cases (see CDC case definitions here).
  • Eye protection (goggles or face shield) is specifically recommended.
  • At this time, there is no available vaccine or chemoprophylaxis.
Photo: Cynthia Goldsmith/Maureen Metcalfe/Azaibi Tamin, CDC.

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